

L21: Privacy


Jeff M. Phillips


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Early 2000s

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Late 2000s His stopped.



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
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Dr. Sweeney now teaches at Harvard.

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
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- Netflix Prize had proposed sequel, dropped in 2010 for more privacy concerns.

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
Laplation Michanism addy Laplace noise Lydx; w) $L_{ap}(x; w) = \frac{1}{2w} exp(-\frac{|x|}{w})$ 5= {si} each si= X: + Lop(1/2=w) $X = \{x, x_3, \dots, x_m\}$ $S = \{x, x_3, \dots, x_m\}$ V = Lup(*k) $S = \{x, x_3, \dots, x_m\}$

Huight X=5x3 x= 66 inches x = 67 inches X'= {x'}


w= 1

 $S = M(x) = x + L_{op}(' \epsilon)$

= exp(1/w(166-70) -167-70)) $= \exp(z(1)) = \exp(z)$



X= {x, x, ... Yn } X: Eleit Binag detabase $X' = 4x', x_{7}, \dots, x_{n}$ somt $x_{i} \neq x_{i}$ R=Interval $\int = \left[a_1b\right]$ IAX = { Xa, Xci, Xaro ... Yh $g_{I}(x) = \xi_{i} \times i = [X \land I]$ $\frac{1}{1} = \begin{bmatrix} a \\ a \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} a \\ b \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} a \\ b \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} a \\ b \end{bmatrix}$ S = M(X) $\{s_1, \dots, s_m\}$ $s_5 = X_5 + Lep(Y_4)$ Leplacian Machanism



4/1I). Lop (1/4) $\left(g_{\mp}(5) - g_{\mp}(x)\right)$ = Jn ((2)

