



Why should you do an OS class?

IN THE AGE OF DATA CENTERS,
HETEROGENEOUS HARDWARE AND
TARGETED SECURITY ATTACKS

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Operating systems haven't changed for decades

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- ▶ 40 years old
 - ▶ Time-sharing
 - ▶ Expensive hardware
 - ▶ Overly general





Ken Thompson (sitting) and Dennis Ritchie working together at a PDP-11 (1972)

cs5460/6460 teaches this system

- ▶ Xv6 is an x86 implementation of UNIX 6th edition
- ▶ All lectures are recorded
 - ▶ You're welcome to take a look



OS kernels are ubiquitous



2.6.36

system calls
and system files

bridges


functions
implementations

hardware interfaces

electronics

networking


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Problem #1: Security

Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities by Year



Example

9

```
static bool dccp_new (...) {  
    struct dccp_header _dh, *dh;
```

```
    - skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);  
    + skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh);  
};
```

Stack smash

Correct

- ▶ Remote exploit in Linux network firewall
 - ▶ Arbitrary code execution
 - ▶ Linux Kernel v 3.0 (June, 2011) – 3.13.6 (March, 2014)
 - ▶ CVE-2014-2523

In a modern system, an attacker is **one kernel vulnerability away** from gaining complete control of the entire machine

▶ Not going to change



Can we make these systems
secure?


RedLeaf Operating System

Rust + Dafny-style verification


Rust

- ▶ Safe language build around idea of linear types
- ▶ Normally, safety requires a garbage collector
 - ▶ Multiple pointers can point into an object
 - ▶ Even if one pointer is deallocated we don't know if there are other aliases
- ▶ In Rust there are no aliases!
 - ▶ No need to walk the heap

Java, C#



Rust



Rust is the first safe alternative to C for low-level systems code

- ▶ Safe code remains fast
 - ▶ No garbage collection
 - ▶ Lightweight fine-grained software isolation
 - ▶ Zero-copy communication across isolated subsystems




Figure 1: Forwarding rate for a minimal DPDK-like device driver implemented in 10 different languages. The driver uses one CPU core to forward packets on two 10 Gbit/s Intel X520 NICs.²

²The Case for Writing Network Drivers in High-Level Programming Languages, ANCS 2019





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Top root causes since 2016:

#1: heap out-of-bounds

#2: use after free

#3: type confusion

#4: uninitialized use

Note: CVEs may have multiple root causes, so they can be counted in multiple categories


Figure 2: Breakdown of root causes for CVEs by year in Microsoft products.² Only 221 out 604 are not safety related.

²Digital Security by Design: Security and Legacy at Microsoft. <https://vimeo.com/376180843>, 2019.

- Device drivers
- Rv6, a POSIX-like operating system
 - A collection of domains
 - File system, network stack, and system calls
 - And user processes
- Device pass through
- Shared heap

All code runs in **Ring 0**

RedLeaf




Problem #2: Performance
What does the new hardware look like?

CPU

- 1 CPU socket
- 4 cores
- 2 logical (HT) threads each

Hyper-Threading
(logical threads)


Cores (4)




Socket





I/O Devices



Multi-socket machines



Dell R830 4-socket server



Dell Poweredge R830 System Server with 2 sockets on the main floor and 2 sockets on the expansion




http://www.dell.com/support/manuals/us/en/19/poweredge-r830/r830_om/supported-configurations-for-the-poweredge-r830-system?guid=guid-01303b2b-f884-4435-b4e2-57bec2ce225a&lang=en-us



But what will it look like in 5-10 years?

- ▶ Massively heterogeneous
 - ▶ Not just many-cores
 - ▶ GPUs, AI accelerators, near-storage and near-network cores
- ▶ But also
 - ▶ Fine-grained hardware ASICs accelerators
 - ▶ Programmable hardware (FPGA)

Redshift: Operating system for heterogeneous hardware



Problem #3: Can we own our data in the cloud?







Image captured by iRobot Roomba Vacuum shows young child on the floor



MinION Nanopore DNA Sequencing


Deeper problem: cloud is inherently collaborative

- Data is processed by third parties



What needs to be done?

► Goal #1



Linux kernel map



It's impossible to secure legacy OS stack

- 27,000,000 LoC
- 40 subsystems
- 8,900 device drivers

Thank you!

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